A Novel Quasigroup Substitution Scheme for Chaos Based Image Encryption by Patidar, Vinod et al.
  Revised version of this paper is accepted for publication in Journal of Applied Nonlinear Dynamics (2017) 
 
 
P
ag
e1
 
A novel quasigroup substitution scheme for chaos based image encryption   
Vinod Patidar1,*, G. Purohit1 and N. K. Pareek2 
1Department of Physics, School of Engineering, Sir Padampat SInghania University, 
Bhatewar, Udaipur – 313601, Rajasthan, INDI A  
2University Computer Centre, Vigyan Bhawan, M.L.S. University, Udaipur -313001, 
Rajasthan, INDIA 
*vinod.patidar@spsu.ac.in, patidar.vinod@gmail.com 
 
  Revised version of this paper is accepted for publication in Journal of Applied Nonlinear Dynamics (2017) 
 
 
P
ag
e2
 
A novel quasigroup substitution scheme for chaos based image encryption 
During last two decades, there has been a prolific growth in the chaos based image 
encryption algorithms.  Up to an extent these algorithms have been able to provide an 
alternative to exchange large media files (images and videos) over the networks in a 
secure way.  However, there have been some issues with the implementation of chaos 
based image ciphers in practice. One of them is reduced/small key space due to the 
fact that chaotic behavior is only observed for certain range of system 
parameters/initial conditions of the chaotic system used in such algorithms. To 
overcome this difficulty, we propose a simple, efficient and robust image encryption 
algorithm based on combined applications of quasigroups and chaotic standard map. 
The proposed image cipher is based on the Shannon’s popular substitution-diffusion 
architecture where a quasigroup of order 256 and chaotic standard map have been 
used for the substitution and permutation of image pixels respectively.  Due to the 
introduction of quasigroup as part of the secret key along with the parameter and 
initial conditions of the chaotic standard map, the key space has been increased 
significantly. The proposed image cipher is very fast due to the fact that the 
substitution based on the quasigroup operations is very simple and can be executed 
easily through the lookup table operations on Latin squares (which are Cayley 
operation tables of quasigroups) and the permutation is performed row-by-row as well 
as column-by-column using the pseudo random number sequences generated through 
the chaotic standard map. The security and performance have been analyzed through 
the histograms, correlation coefficients, information entropy, key sensitivity analysis, 
differential analysis, key space analysis etc. and the results prove the efficiency and 
robustness of the proposed image cipher against the possible security threats. 
 
Keywords: Image encryption; chaos; quasigroup; Latin squares; permutation; 
substitution 
Subject classification codes: include these here if the journal requires them 
1. Introduction 
Chaos based image encryption has been an active research area over the last few years 
which has proven that a suitable choice of chaotic systems along with an intelligently 
designed combination of mixing transformations (substitution and diffusion 
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transformations) comprising of complex involvement of the key leads to very fast and 
potentially reliable image encryption algorithm [Fridrich, 1998, Mao et al., 2004, Chen et 
al., 2004, Pareek et al., 2006, Patidar et al., 2009]. Since the dynamics of the chaotic 
system, used in most of the chaos based cryptosystems, is control/system parameter 
dependent, they exhibit desired chaotic behavior only for certain ranges/values of 
control/system parameters. Hence the cryptosystems based on chaotic systems mainly suffer 
from key size requirements [Alvarez & Li, 2006, Kelber & Schwarz, 2007, Rhouma et al., 
2010, Solak et al., 2010, Ozkaynak and Ozer, 2016]. Despite above mentioned drawback of 
having a reduced key space, the chaotic systems have been a preferred choice [Patidar et al., 
2011, Wang and Xu, 2015, Wu et al., 2016, Abd-El-Hafiz et al., 2016, Farajallah et al., 
2016] for the image encryption systems due to their features: ergodicity, mixing property, 
sensitivity to initial conditions/system parameters, etc.  having close resemblance with the 
ideal cryptographic properties:  confusion, diffusion, balance, avalanche properties, etc. 
[Alvarez & Li, 2006].  
The algebraic structures known as Quasigroups [Pflugfelder, 1991] also provide a 
powerful method for generating a larger set of permutation/substitution transformations by 
rearranging not only the data values, but also changing the data values across their range. 
The Cayley table of a finite quasi group of order n is a Latin square [Dénes & Keedwell, 
1991] and the number of Latin squares of order n increases very quickly with n and indeed 
very large for rather small n [Lint & Wilson, 1992, Jacobson & Matthews, 1996]. Hence, 
such transformations can provide a potent combination of confusion and diffusion in the 
encryption of digital images and also the Quasigroup based cryptosystem can generate more 
number of keys even when we consider a small order quasiqroup.   
In most of the conventional cryptographic algorithms [Schneier, 1996] the 
associative algebraic structures such as groups, rings and fields are used.  Dénes and 
  Revised version of this paper is accepted for publication in Journal of Applied Nonlinear Dynamics (2017) 
 
 
P
ag
e4
 
Keedwell [Dénes & Keedwell, 1992, Keedwell 1999] proclaimed the start of new era in 
cryptography by using the non-associative algebraic structures such as quasigroups and neo-
fields. Since then there have been some attempts of designing quasigroup based 
pseudorandom number generators/cryptographic schemes [Kościelny, 1996, Kościelny & 
Mullen, 1999, Golomb et al. 2001, Gligoroski, 2004, Gligoroski, 2005, Markovski et al., 
2005, Satti and Kak, 2009, Battey and Parakh, 2013] but weaknesses have been found in 
them [Dichtl & Böffgen, 2012] and have seen relatively less success than chaos based 
systems. Some of the comprehensive and in-depth overviews of the recent developments 
and current state of the art in the field of applications of quasigrous in cryptology can be 
seen in [Shcherbacov, 2012, Mileva, 2014]. 
As mentioned earlier that the chaos based cryptosystems mainly suffer from key size 
requirements and the quasigroups can provide a larger set of permutation/substitution 
transformations i.e., an immensely large number of keys. Keeping these facts in mind we 
propose in this paper a simple, efficient and robust image encryption algorithm based on 
combined applications of quasigroups and chaotic dynamical systems. The proposed image 
cipher is a block cipher and based on the Shannon’s substitution-diffusion architecture 
[Shannon, 1949] which has been the main core structure of most of the chaos based image 
encryption algorithms developed during last one and half decade.  In the proposed image 
cipher we use a quasigroup of order 256 and chaotic standard map for the substitution and 
permutation of image pixels respectively.  The secret key of the image cipher comprises of a 
quasigroup of order 256, initial conditions & parameter of chaotic standard map.  The 
encryption in the proposed image cipher has minimum (maximum) two (sixteen) rounds and 
each round has a substitution and a permutation module.  The substitution is done column-
wise and row-wise starting from the first and last pixel respectively through the left and 
right quasigroup binary operations on a 256 order quasigroup (which is part of the secret 
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key).  However the permutation is performed row-by-row as well as column-by-column 
using the pseudo random number sequences generated through the chaotic standard map. 
Due to introduction of quasigroup as the part of secret key, the proposed image cipher does 
not suffer with the key size requirement (as opposed to the most of the existing chaos based 
image ciphers) since the no. of possible quasigroups of order 256 lies somewhere in the 
range 0.753 × 10102805 ≥ 𝐿(256) ≥ 0.304 × 10101724 [Lint & Wilson, 1992, Jacobson & 
Matthews, 1996]. The proposed image cipher is very fast due to the fact that the substitution 
based on the quasigroup operations are simple and can be executed easily through the 
lookup table operations on Latin squares (which are Cayley operation tables of quasigroups) 
without any explicit binary quasigroup operation calculation. We also present the results of 
our security and performance analysis of the proposed image encryption done through the 
histograms, correlation coefficients, information entropy, key sensitivity analysis, 
differential analysis, key space analysis etc.  Results are encouraging and illustrate the 
efficiency and robustness of the proposed image cipher against the possible security threats. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly introduce the notion of 
quasigroup and associated operations which have been used in the proposed algorithm. In 
Section 3 we describe in detail the complete process of encryption and decryption used in 
the proposed image cipher. In Sections 4 to 7, we summarize the results of our statistical, 
key-sensitivity, differential and key space analyses to assess the performance and robustness 
of the proposed image cipher.  Finally Section 8 concludes the paper.  
2. The quasigroup 
The structure (𝑄, ⊛), 𝑄 = {𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3, 𝑞4, … … … . . , 𝑞𝑛}, ‖𝑄‖ = 𝑛 is called a finite 
quasigroup of order n [Pflugfelder, 1991] if,  
∀ 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑄, ∃ 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑄 such that 𝑎 ⊛ 𝑥 = 𝑏 and y ⊛ 𝑎 = 𝑏 
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∀ 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑄, 𝑥 ⊛ 𝑦 = 𝑥 ⊛ 𝑧 ⇒ 𝑦 = 𝑧 and 𝑦 ⊛ 𝑥 = 𝑧 ⊛ 𝑥 ⇒ 𝑦 = 𝑧 
Thus the Cayley table of a finite quasigroup of order n is a Latin square of order n and vice-
versa. A Latin square is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 array filled with n different symbols in such a way that 
each of the symbol occurring exactly once in each row and exactly once in each column 
[Dénes & Keedwell, 1991]. With every quasigroup (𝑄, ⊛) there exist two more operations 
⃠ and ⊘ satisfying the following 
 ∀ 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑄 such that 𝑥 ⊛ 𝑦 = 𝑧 ⇔ 𝑦 = 𝑥⃠ 𝑧 ⇔ 𝑥 = 𝑧 ⊘ 𝑦.  
These operations ⃠ and ⊘ can be referred as left and right inverse quasigroup operations 
respectively and the structures (𝑄, ⃠) and (𝑄, ⊘) also form quasigroups of the same 
order. In Figure 1, we have given example of an order 5 quasigroup along with its left and 
right inverse. 
The number of Latin squares of order 𝑛 increases very quickly with 𝑛 and indeed 
very large for rather small 𝑛. The total number of all possible Latin squares 𝐿(𝑛) of order 
𝑛 × 𝑛 is only known up to 𝑛 = 11, which is L(11)=
776966836171770144107444346734230682311065600000.  The most accurate 
upper and lower bound for the number of Latin squares of order 𝑛 is [Lint & Wilson, 1992, 
Jacobson & Matthews, 1996] 
∏(𝑘!)𝑛/𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
≥ 𝐿(𝑛) ≥
(𝑛!)2𝑛
𝑛𝑛2
 
According to this, the upper and lower bounds for the 𝐿(256) are: 0.753 × 10102805 ≥
𝐿(256) ≥ 0.304 × 10101724. Therefore we may safely conclude that there exist atleast 
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𝑛! (𝑛 − 1)! … .2! 1! Latin squares of order 𝑛. Hence such Latin squares can be potentially 
used as secret keys in symmetric cryptography.  
3. The proposed image cipher 
3.1 The original image to be encrypted: 
The original colour image of height H and width W  is the image to be encrypted.  The 
image is read as a 3D matrix ),,( kjiPI of integers between 0 and 255, where Hi1  , 
Wj1   and  31  k .  Thus, we have total 3WH  integer elements in the 3D input 
image matrix. 
3.2 The secret key:   
The secret key in the proposed image encryption technique is divided into two parts. First 
part consists of a set of three floating point numbers and four integers 
)2,1,,,,,( 00 seedseedNRNSKyx , where )2,0(, 00 yx , K  can have any real value greater 
than 18.0, NS is an integer value preferably greater than 100, NR  is an integer value 
between 1 and 16, which is treated as number of encryption rounds, 1seed  and 2seed  are 
integers between 0 to 255 and used as the seed values for the initiation of the substitution. 
The second part is a 256 X 256  gray image whose gray pixel values (+1) form a 256 X 256  
Latin square which is the Cayley operation table of a quasigroup. This table is basically used 
as the lookup table for the quasigroup substitution. The generation of quasigroups of desired 
order through software or hardware is very easy [Kościelny, 2002, Mihajloska et al., 2013] 
hence the secret key of the proposed image encryption scheme can be generated very easily. 
3.3 Calculation of the dimension of new 2D matrix: 
Here we calculate the dimension of 2D matrix ( NH  and NW ) using the values of W  and 
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H .  It is calculated in such a way that NWNHWH  3  and )( NHNW   is 
minimum, hence NHNW  . With the above mentioned conditions, we try to form a square 
2D matrix as far as possible from all the elements of 3D image matrix, if it is not possible 
then we form a rectangular matrix with the lowest possible difference in the number of rows 
and columns. The 3WH  integer elements are then arranged into a 2D matrix P(i,j) 
where 1 ≤ i ≤ NH and 1 ≤ j ≤ NW. 
3.4 Substitution using the quasi group binary operations: 
In the proposed image cipher, we use quasigroup operation table to introduce the 
confusion/substitution.  As explained above in the secret key section that we use a 
quasigroup of order 256 i.e. its Cayley table is a 256X256 matrix consisting of integers 
ranging from 1 to 256 in such a way that no integer occurs twice in a particular row or 
column.  However, the pixel intensity level in RGB images vary from 0 to 255 hence before 
starting the actual substitution/confusion, we add 1 to all the integers of the 2D matrix P(i, 
j). 
3.4.1 Column wise substitution starting from the first pixel (left quasigroup binary 
operation) 
 
for j=1 to NW 
for i=1 to NH 
 if (i=1 & j=1) 
 P(i,j)=seed1⊛P(i, j) 
 else 
 if (i=1 & j≠1) 
  P(i, j)=P(NH, j-1)⊛P(i, j) 
 else 
  P(i,j)=P(i-1, j)⊛P(i, j) 
 end 
 end 
       end 
end 
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3.4.2 Row wise substitution starting from the last pixel (right quasigroup binary 
operation) 
  
  
After completion of the quasigroup substitution, subtract 1 from all the integers of the 2D 
matrix.   
3.5 Permutation of rows and columns using chaotic standard map: 
The permutation of the pixels in the proposed image cipher is a simplified version of the 
chaotic standard map based permutation used in the pseudorandom-substitution scheme 
[Patidar et al., 2011].  The execution/algorithmic details of the permutation used in the 
proposed image cipher are as follows: 
Iterate the standard map NS times, starting with the initial conditions ),( 00 yx  and using the 
parameter K specified in the secret key and the new values are stored as ),( yx .  
Now calculate the number of iteration to skip from the 2D matrix obtained after the 
substitution in the following way. 
256mod)},(...)1,2(),1(...)2,1()1,1({ NWNHPPNWPPPNSK   
Then we generate the permutation boxes and then execute the permutation of rows and 
columns with the help of chaotic standard map in the following way: 
 for i = NH to 1 
 for j=NW to 1 
 if (j=NW &  i=NH) 
 P(i,j)=P(i, j)⊛seed2 
 else 
 if (j=NW & i≠NH) 
  P(i, j)=P(i, j)⊛P(i+1, 1) 
 else 
  P(i,j)=P(i, j)⊛P(i, j+1) 
 end 
 end 
       end 
end 
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In the above algorithm :),(iP , )(:, jP  and :)(:,P respectively, represent all the elements of 
ith row, all the elements of jth column and all the elements of matrix P. 
These modules of substitution and permutation are repeated sequentially NR number of 
times (as specified in the secret key).  We recommend at least two rounds of encryption to 
ensure the foolproof security.  Finally the elements of 2D matrix ),( jiC  are arranged in a 
3D matrix ),,( kjiCI  of dimension 3WH  followed by a conversion to a colour image. It 
is the final encrypted image.  The whole process of encryption is depicted in a simple block 
diagram in Figure 2. 
The process of decryption is completely reverse of the encryption process. For the 
proper decryption the same secret key is to be supplied and the encrypted image is 
 for k =1 to NSK 
  2mod)sin( yKxx   
  2mod)( xyy   
 end 
for j =1 to NW step 1 
  2mod)sin( yKxx   
  2mod)( xyy   
  





 NH
x
jPR
2
1)(1  
  





 NW
y
jPC
2
1)(1  
  2mod)sin( yKxx   
  2mod)( xyy   
  





 NH
x
jPR
2
1)(2  
  





 NW
y
jPC
2
1)(2  
 end 
for j =1 to NH step 1 
  interchange :)),(1( jPRP  and :)),(2( jPRP  
 end 
 for j =1 to NW step 1 
  interchange ))(1(:, jPCP  and ))(2(:, jPCP  
 end 
 C(:, :)=P(:, :) 
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processed in the same way as in the encryption. The only difference would be that the 
substitution and permutation operations will be executed in the reverse order. Below we 
describe the algorithms used for the recovery of permutation and substitution during the 
decryption process. 
3.6 Recover the permutation of rows and columns using chaotic standard map: 
Iterate the standard map NS  times, starting with the initial conditions ),( 00 yx  and using the 
parameter K  specified in the secret key and the new values are stored as ),( yx .  
Now calculate the number of iteration to skip from the 2D matrix ),( jiC  of the encrypted 
image (obtained in the same way as in encryption)  
256mod)},(...)1,2(),1(...)2,1()1,1({ NWNHCCNWCCCNSK   
Then we generate the permutation boxes and then execute the permutation of rows and 
columns with the help of chaotic standard map in the following way: 
 
  Revised version of this paper is accepted for publication in Journal of Applied Nonlinear Dynamics (2017) 
 
 
P
ag
e1
2
 
 
3.7 Recover the substitution using inverse quasi group operations: 
Before starting the recovery of substitution add 1 to all the elements of 2D matrix ),( jiC . 
for k =1 to NSK 
  2mod)sin( yKxx   
  2mod)( xyy   
end 
for j =1 to NW step 1 
  2mod)sin( yKxx   
  2mod)( xyy   
  





 NH
x
jPR
2
1)(1  
  





 NW
y
jPC
2
1)(1  
  2mod)sin( yKxx   
  2mod)( xyy   
  





 NH
x
jPR
2
1)(2  
  





 NW
y
jPC
2
1)(2  
end 
for j =NW to 1 step -1 
  interchange ))(2(:, jPCC  and ))(1(:, jPCC  
end 
for j =NH to 1 step -1 
  interchange :)),(2( jPRC  and :)),(1( jPRC  
end 
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3.7.1 Recover the row wise substitution (right inverse quasigroup operation) 
  
 
3.7.2 Recover the column wise substitution (left inverse quasigroup operation) 
 
 
After completion of the recovery of the substitution subtract 1 from all the integers of the 
output 2D matrix.  In the above recovery algorithm ⊘ and ⃠ respectively, represent the 
right inverse and left inverse quasigroup operations.  These recovery modules of substitution 
and permutation are repeated sequentially NR number of times (as specified in the secret 
 CRT(:, :)=C(:, :) 
 for i = NH to 1 
 for j=NW to 1 
 if (j=NW &  i=NH) 
 C(i,j)=CRT(i, j)⊘seed2 
 else 
 if (j=NW & i≠NH) 
  C(i, j)=CRT(i, j)⊘CRT(i+1, 1) 
 else 
  C(i,j)=CRT(i, j)⊘CRT(i, j+1) 
 end 
 end 
       end 
end 
 CCT(:, :) = C(:, :) 
for j=1 to NW 
for i=1 to NH 
 if (i=1 & j=1) 
 C(i, j)=seed1⃠CCT(i, j) 
 else 
 if (i=1 & j≠1) 
  C(i, j)=CCT(NH, j-1)⃠CCT(i, j) 
 else 
  C(i, j)=CCT(i-1, j)⃠CCT(i, j) 
 end 
 end 
       end 
end 
 P(:, :)=C(:, :) 
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key).  Finally the elements of 2D matrix ),( jiP  are arranged in a 3D matrix ),,( kjiPI  of 
dimension 3XWXH  followed by a conversion to a colour image. It is the decrypted 
image. 
4. The statistical analysis: 
To check the statistical relationship between the plaintext and ciphertext produced using the 
proposed image cipher, we have done extensive statistical analysis by computing the image 
histograms, information entropy, correlation between the pair of plain and cipher images, 
and correlation between the adjacent pixels for a large number of images having widely 
different contents.  In Table 1, we have shown the encryption of the two sample images i.e. 
image ‘Lena’ and an ‘all-zero’ image of size 200 X 200. Here the resultant images are 
shown after substitution using the quasigroup and permutation using the chaotic map for the 
two rounds.  The secret key used for the encryption has also been mentioned in the first row 
of the table.  In Figures 3 and 4 respectively, we have depicted the histograms of the plain 
and cipher images for the image ‘Lena’ and an ‘all-zero’ image for the first two rounds of 
encryption.  Particularly in the first column-the histograms for the red, green and blue layers 
of the plain image have been shown however in the second and third columns the 
corresponding histograms of the cipher images after first and second rounds respectively 
have been depicted.  It is very clear from the visual inspection of the histograms that the 
distribution of the pixel values in the cipher images is uniform/flat, random and independent 
of the original images. 
To quantify the uniformity of the pixel distribution in the cipher images, we have also 
computed the information entropy / Shannon entropy [Shannon, 1949]. The information 
entropy quantifies the amount of information contained in data, usually in bits or 
bits/symbol. It is also the minimum message symbol length necessary to communicate the 
information. In other words, information entropy is a measure of disorder.  For example, a 
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long sequence of repeating characters has entropy  0, since every character is predictable 
and  a truly random sequence has maximum entropy, since there is no way to predict the 
next character in the sequence.  
The information entropy )(mH  of a message m  is calculated by using




12
0
2
)(
1
log)()(
N
i i
i
mP
mPmH  (bits), where )( imP is the probability of occurrence of symbol 
im  in the message m  and N  is the number of bits required to represent a symbol in the 
message m . For a 24-bit colour image (I), the information entropy for each colour layer 
(Red, Green and Blue) is calculated using 



12
0
//2
////
8
)(
1
log)()(
i
i
BGRi
BGRBGR
IP
IPIH  (bits). 
A truly random image (RI) has uniform distribution of pixel intensities in the interval [0, 
255] i.e. 256/1)(// i
BGR RIP  for all ]255,0[i , hence 8)(
// RIH BGR  bits. 
In Table 2, we have given our computed results of information entropy for the image ‘Lena’ 
and an ‘all-zero’ plain images and their corresponding cipher images produced using the 
secret keys given in Table 1.  It is clear that the information entropy is larger than 7.99 for 
all the cipher images produced through the proposed image cipher.   
 
We have also calculated the correlation between various pairs of plain and cipher images by 
computing the 2-dimensional correlation coefficients between various colour channels of the 
plain and cipher images.  The 2D-correlation coefficients have been calculated using the 
following relation:  
  
    




















  
 
H
i
W
j
ji
H
i
W
j
ji
H
i
W
j
jiji
AB
BB
WH
AA
WH
BBAA
WH
C
1 1
2
,
1 1
2
,
1 1
,,
11
1
, 
with 
 

H
1i
W
1j
jiA
WH
1
A , and 
 

H
1i
W
1j
jiB
WH
1
B , . 
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Here A  represents one of the red (R), green (G) & blue (B) channels of the plain image, B  
represents one of the red (R), green (G) & blue (B) channels of the cipher image, A  & B  
respectively, are the mean values of the elements of 2D matrices A  & B  and H & W  
respectively, are the height & width of the plain/cipher image.  The results of our calculation 
of correlation coefficients for the image ‘Lena’ and an ‘all-zero’ image and their 
corresponding cipher images (shown in Table 1) have been given in Table 3.  It is clear that 
the correlation coefficients between various channels of the plain image and cipher image 
are very small (or practically zero), hence the cipher images bear no clue about their 
corresponding plain images. 
 To analyze the correlations of adjacent pixels (horizontally as well as vertically) in 
the plain and cipher images, we have also computed the correlation coefficients for all the 
pairs of horizontally and vertically adjacent pixels in all plain and cipher images. This 
computation has been done by using the following formula:  



















N
1i
2
i
N
1i
2
i
N
1i
ii
yy
N
1
xx
N
1
yyxx
N
1
C
)()(
))((
, 
with 


N
1i
ix
N
1
x and 


N
1i
iy
N
1
y . 
Here ix and iy form 
thi pair of horizontally/vertically adjacent pixels and N is the total 
number of pairs of horizontally/vertically adjacent pixels.  For an image of size HW 
pixels H1WN )(  (for horizontally adjacent pixels) and W1HN )(   (for vertically 
adjacent pixels).  The results of our calculation for the correlation coefficient between the 
horizontally and vertically adjacent pixels for the images ‘Lena’ and ‘All-zero’ and their 
corresponding cipher images are given in Table 4.  We observe that adjacent pixels in plain 
images are highly correlated however for the pixels in cipher images the correlation is 
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almost zero hence the proposed image encryption technique removes the correlation 
between the adjacent pixels. 
5. The key sensitivity analysis: 
Extreme key sensitivity guarantees the security of a cryptosystem against the brute force 
attacks.  The key sensitivity means the cipher image produced by the cryptosystem should 
be very sensitive to the secret key i.e., if we use two slightly different keys to encrypt the 
same image then two cipher images produced should be completely independent of each 
other.  To test the key sensitivity of the proposed image cipher, we have first encrypted the 
plain image ‘Lena’ with a specific choice of the secret key and store the encrypted image as 
‘Encrypted Image’.  Now we make a small change in the one of the several parts of the 
secret key and produce the cipher image ‘Encrypted Image X’ and then we compare both the 
cipher images. The Table 5 gives the details of the various possibilities of minimal changes 
in the secret key and corresponding cipher images.  
To quantifying mutual independence of these encrypted images we have calculated 
the 2D-correlation and mutual information for the pair of encrypted images.  The 2D 
correlation has been calculated in the same manner as done in the statistical analysis section 
above.  However the mutual information between the two encrypted images 
1
I and 
2
I is 
calculated using ),()()();(
212121
IIHIHIHIIMI  , here )(
1
IH , )(
2
IH are the 
information entropies calculated for the image 
1
I and 
2
I using the probability distributions 
)(
1
IP , )(
2
IP  respectively.  However ),(
21
IIH is the joint information entropy of 
1
I and 
2
I
calculated using the joint probability distribution ),(
21
IIP . In Table 6, we have given the 
computed results of the 2D correlation coefficients and mutual information for the pair of 
encrypted images produced through very similar keys (as described in Table 5). It is very 
clear that the correlation between the cipher images produced using the very similar keys is 
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negligible and also the mutual information between them is very low indicating that 
knowing the content of  one cipher image 
1
I does not reveal any information about the other 
cipher image 
2
I  and vice versa. Hence the proposed image cipher exhibits very high key 
sensitivity. 
6. The differential analysis 
The differential analysis is the study of how small changes in the plaintext affect the 
resultant ciphertext with the application of the same secret key.  It is generally done by 
implementing the chosen plaintext attack but now there are extensions which use known 
plaintext as well as ciphertext attacks also.  For image cryptosystems a very common 
strategy to implement the differential analysis, is to make a slight change, usually one pixel, 
in the plain image and compare the two cipher images (obtained by applying the same key 
on two plain images having one pixel difference only).  If a meaningful relationship can be 
between established the plain image and cipher image then it may further facilitates us in 
determining the secret key. However if the image cryptosystem produces significant, 
random and unpredictable changes in the ciphertext under one pixel change in the plain 
image then such differential analysis become inefficient.  The two most common measures: 
NPCR (net pixel change rate) and UACI (unified average changing intensity) are used to 
test the vulnerability of the image cryptosystems against the differential analysis.   
The NPCR is used to measure the percentage number of pixels in difference of a particular 
colour channel in two cipher images obtained by applying the same secret key on two plain 
images having one pixel difference only.  If 
BGR
jiC
//
,  and 
BGR
jiC
//
,  (where Hi1  and 
Wj1  , H is height and W is width and R, G and B represent red, green and blue 
channels) represent two cipher images then NPCR for each colour channel is defined as: 
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%
//
,
// 100
HW
D
NPCR
H
1i
W
1j
BGR
ji
BGR 



 
 
where 







BGR
ji
BGR
ji
BGR
ji
BGR
jiBGR
ji
CCif1
CCif0
D
//
,
//
,
//
,
//
,//
,
. 
The NPCR value for two random images, which is an expected estimate for an ideal image 
cryptosystem, is given by 
 
  %//// 10021NPCR BGRLBGRExpected   , 
here BGRL //  is the number of bits used to represent the red, green or blue channels of the 
image.  For a 24-bit true colour image (8 bit for each colour channel) 8L BGR //  hence
%.// 609499NPCR BGRExpected  . 
The UACI, the average intensity difference of a particular channel between two cipher 
images 
BGR
jiC
//
,  and 
BGR
jiC
//
, , is defined as: 
%
//
//
,
//
,// 
 





H
1i
W
1j
BGRL
BGR
ji
BGR
jiBGR 100
12
CC
HW
1
UACI
. 
The UACI value for two random images, which is an expected estimate for an ideal image 
cryptosystem is given by 
%100
12
)1(
.
2
1
//
//
//
12
1
2
// 






BGR
BGRL
BGR L
i
L
BGR
Expected
ii
UACI
. 
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For a 24-bit true colour image %4635.33
// BGRExpectedUACI . 
We have done an extensive analysis to compute the NPCR and UACI for the proposed 
image cipher using two plain images ‘Lena’ and ‘All-zero” and the secret key given in the 
first row of the Table 1.  Particularly we have randomly chosen 200 different pixels (one at a 
time, including the very first and very last pixels of the image) in each plain image and 
changed one of the R, G, B intensity values by one unit only and computed the NPCR and 
UACI as explained above for all 200 cases each for both the plain images.  The computed 
results of NPCR and UACI have been depicted in Figures 5 and 6 respectively for the 
‘Lena’ and ‘all-zero’ images.  It is clear that the NPCR and UACI values are distributed in a 
small interval around the ideal values 99.6094 and 33.4635 (shown by the horizontal lines) 
respectively.  Hence the proposed image cipher shows extreme sensitivity on the plaintext 
and not vulnerable to the differential attacks like: chosen plaintext, known plaintext and 
adaptive chosen plaintext attacks. 
7. The key space analysis 
The secret key in the proposed image encryption technique is divided into two parts. First 
part consists of a set of three floating point numbers and four integers 
)2,1,,,,,(
00
seedseedNRNSKyx , where ),(, 20yx 00  , K  can have any real value greater 
than 18.0, NS is an integer value preferably greater than 100, NR is an integer value 
between 1 and 16, which is treated as no. of encryption rounds, seed1 and seed2 are integers 
between 0 to 255 and used as the seed values for the initiation of the substitution. The 
second part is a 256X256 gray image whose gray pixel values form a 256X256 Latin square. 
The key space (i.e., the total number of different keys that can be used in the 
encryption/decryption) for the proposed image encryption scheme can be calculated as 
follows: (i) By following the discussion in Patidar et al. [Patidar et al., 2011] the key space 
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for the chaotic standard map parameters is (6.28)3×1042, (ii) total possible values of NS is 
103, (iii) total possible values of NR is 15, (iv) total possible values of seed1 and seed2 are 
256 each and the most important the minimum possible combination of quasigroup QG 
image of  256X256 is 10101724.  Hence the total key space of the proposed image encryption 
algorithm is greater than 2.434× 10101769. 
8. Conclusion 
In a large number of proposals on chaos based image encryption schemes, it has been 
observed that these schemes offer a good combination of performance and security features.  
In most of such schemes control parameters or initial conditions of the chaotic systems have 
been used as part of the secret key. However, chaotic systems offer desirable properties only 
for the certain ranges of such parameters/initial conditions, the key space available for such 
image encryption techniques is greatly reduced and opens possibilities for a brute force 
attack.   With an objective to increase the available key space and retaining all the desirable 
properties offered by chaos based image encryption schemes, we have proposed a simple, 
efficient and robust image encryption scheme based on the combined applications of 
quasigroups and chaotic dynamical systems.  Our analysis results show that the proposed 
image cipher possesses a very large key space (which is practically impossible to break 
through brute force attack) as well as all other desirable properties which an ideal image 
encryption system should have.  We believe that it is one of the very first steps taken and 
further research will open new avenues in the area of combined application of chaos and 
quasigroups (Latin squares) in image encryption. 
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Figure 1: Quasigroup of order 5 and its left and right inverses 
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Figure 2: Block diagram of the proposed image cipher 
 
Permutation of 
Rows and Columns 
using Chaotic 
Substutution of 
Pixels using 
Input Colour image 
(3D array of pixels) 
2D image NH X NW 
(H*W*3=NH*NW) 
X0, Y0, K, 
NS, NR 
Quasigroup 
of order 256 
(an array of 
256 X 256) 
N
R
 T
im
es 
2D image NH X NW 
(H*W*3=NH*NW) 
Encrypted Colour 
image 
(3D array of pixels) 
  Revised version of this paper is accepted for publication in Journal of Applied Nonlinear Dynamics (2017) 
 
 
P
ag
e2
7
 
 
Figure 3: The histograms of the plain image ‘Lena’ (first column) and its cipher images for 
the first two rounds of encryption. The secret key used is given in Table 1. 
 
Figure 4: The histograms of an ‘all-zero’ plain image (first column) and its cipher images 
for the first two rounds of encryption. The secret key used is given in Table 1. 
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Figure 5: NPCR and UACI values for the plain image ‘Lena’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: NPCR and UACI values for the “all-zero’plain image  
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Table 1: The encryption of images ‘Lena’ and ‘All-zero’ 
The secret Key 
472
1391
2
108
57666125108.437455
1234584.56538639
5324752.86295319
0
0







seed
seed
NR
NS
K
y
x
 
 
Quasigroup 
Image 
256X256 
Plain Image 
  
NR=1 
After 
Substitution 
  
After 
Permutation 
  
Encrypted 
Image 
  
NR=2 
After 
Substitution 
  
After 
Permutation 
  
Encrypted 
Image 
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Table 2: Information Entropy (bits) 
 Red Green Blue 
Plain Image Lena 7.2461 7.5410 6.9737 
Cipher image Lena (NR=1) 7.9958 7.9948 7.9955 
Cipher image Lena (NR=2) 7.9956 7.9958 7.9957 
Plain image All Zero 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cipher image All zero (NR=1) 7.9947 7.9956 7.9953 
Cipher image All zero (NR=2) 7.9956 7.9953 7.9954 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation between plain and cipher images 
 
  Red Green Blue 
Lena 
NR = 1 
Red 0.0047 0.0027 0.0044 
Green -0.0077 0.0028 -0.0033 
Blue 0.0089 0.0036 -0.0023 
NR=2 
Red -0.0024 0.0059 0.0018 
Green -0.0052 0.0039 0.0010 
Blue -0.0074 0.0028 0.0000 
All Zero 
NR = 1 
Red 0.0048 0.0069 0.0036 
Green 0.0048 0.0069 0.0036 
Blue 0.0048 0.0069 0.0036 
NR=2 
Red 0.0051 0.0031 0.0037 
Green 0.0051 0.0031 0.0037 
Blue 0.0051 0.0031 0.0037 
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Table 4: Correlation between adjacent pixels 
 
  Red Green Blue 
Plain Image Lena 
Horizontal 0.9395 0.9385 0.8975 
Vertical 0.9709     0.9706     0.9459 
Cipher image Lena (NR=1) 
Horizontal 0.0022 0.0000 -0.0029 
Vertical -0.0055 0.0033 0.0027 
Cipher image Lena (NR=2) 
Horizontal 0.0033 -0.0021 -0.0051 
Vertical -0.0057 0.0001 -0.0022 
Plain image All Zero 
Horizontal 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Vertical 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Cipher image All zero (NR=1) 
Horizontal -0.0019 0.0026 -0.0058 
Vertical 0.0024 0.0022 0.0036 
Cipher image All zero (NR=2) 
Horizontal -0.0011 0.0023 -0.0014 
Vertical 0.0015 0.0055 -0.0030 
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Table 5: Details of encrypted images produced for the key sensitivity analysis along with 
corresponding secret keys 
 
 Secret Key Cipher Image 
1. 
472
1391
2
108
57666125108.437455
1234584.56538639
5324752.86295319
0
0







seed
seed
NR
NS
K
y
x
 
 
Quasigroup Image 256X256 
Encrypted Image 
2. 1st and 2nd rows of the Quasigroup image are interchanged and  
the rest of the secret key remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 1 
3. 255th and 256th rows of the Quasigroup image are interchanged 
and the rest of the secret key remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 2 
4. 1st and 2nd columns of the Quasigroup image are interchanged 
and  the rest of the secret key remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 3 
5. 
255th and 256th columns of the Quasigroup image are 
interchanged and the rest of the secret key remains same as in S. 
No. 1 
Encrypted Image 4 
6. 128th and 129th rows of the Quasigroup image are interchanged 
and the rest of the secret key remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 5 
7. 
128th and 129th columns of the Quasigroup image are 
interchanged and the rest of the secret key remains same as in S. 
No. 1 
Encrypted Image 6 
8. 1Seed  value is changed by one unit and the rest of the secret 
key remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 7 
9. 2Seed value is changed by one unit and the rest of the secret 
key remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 8 
10. NR  value is changed by one unit and the rest of the secret key 
remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 9 
11. NS value is changed by one unit and the rest of the secret key 
remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 10 
12. K value is changed by 10-14 and the rest of the secret key 
remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 11 
13. 
0
y  value is changed by 10-14 and the rest of the secret key 
remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 12 
14. 
0
x  value is changed by 10-14 and the rest of the secret key 
remains same as in S. No. 1 
Encrypted Image 13 
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Table 6: Correlation and mutual information between ‘Encrypted Image’ and ‘Encrypted 
Image X’ (correlate with Table 5) 
Encrypted Image X 
Correlation Mutual Information 
(bits) R G B 
Encrypted Image 1 -0.0050 0.0068 0.0021 0.4505 
Encrypted Image 2 -0.0058 -0.0047 -0.0086 0.4491 
Encrypted Image 3 -0.0015 -0.0037 0.0025 0.4480 
Encrypted Image 4 0.0007 0.0061 0.0048 0.4484 
Encrypted Image 5 0.0015 0.0037 0.0039 0.4470 
Encrypted Image 6 0.0033 0.0009 -0.0031 0.4495 
Encrypted Image 7 -0.0024 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.4499 
Encrypted Image 8 -0.0056 0.0019 -0.0075 0.4482 
Encrypted Image 9 0.0013 0.0016 0.0061 0.4517 
Encrypted Image 10 -0.0023 -0.0016 0.0056 0.4515 
Encrypted Image 11 0.0046 -0.0066 -0.0052 0.4471 
Encrypted Image 12 -0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0010 0.4478 
Encrypted Image 13 -0.0060 0.0089 -0.0082 0.4496 
 
 
